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Identity theory provides a useful foundation for understanding how social factors 
influence the acceptance of evidence. This is because identity theory provides a 
framework of how we process information from other people depending on what social 
positions we occupy. The current study explored how the perception of power impacts 
the processing of an identity threat with college student participants (N=217). High 
power was predicted to decrease acceptance of identity-threatening information, and low 
power was predicted to increase acceptance of identity-threatening information. 
However, the study yielded non-significant effects of power on the acceptance of 
identity-threatening information. Results did show that individuals were more likely to 
accept identity-threatening information when they felt secure about their career prospects 
within their chosen major. Future research may be able parse out how exogenous social 
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Can social factors impact how likely individuals are to accept evidence? Humans 
are social creatures, interacting with many groups on a routine basis. These social 
interactions provide us with identities, which are linked to a set of beliefs about how we 
should enact those identities. that help in navigating an uncertain and chaotic world. 
Because identities provide a framework for making sense of our environments, they can 
be psychologically and socially adaptive. Our identities can help us understand our 
worlds so when an individual is exposed to information that conflicts with their identity, 
they may become threatened and even reject the information, even if it is supported by 
strong evidence (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). This occurs because individuals are 
psychologically motivated to avoid any mismatch between information from the 
environment and their identities (Zanna and Cooper 1976). Because avoiding these 
mismatches can prevent psychological discomfort, the generally adaptive processes from 
identities can become inappropriate by biasing our information processing with more 
routinized responses. Research has shown that exogenous variables, such as thinking 
about positive values, can impact how people respond to identity-threatening information 
(Sherman and Cohen 2006; Sherman 2013). However, little is known about how power 
impacts the processing of identity threats. Power has been shown to reduce our attention 
to other perspectives (Galinsky et al 2006). Identity theory involves considering other 
perspectives to formulate our own identity (Felson 1985). Because both power and 
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identity theory involve consider the perspectives of others, we have reason to 
believe that power should affect identity threats. Thus, the current study seeks to find out 
if feeling powerful, and subsequently paying less attention to other perspectives, would 
























The concept of social power has been studied extensively in sociology (Boulding 
2011). Theorists such as Emerson (1962) have argued that power is heavily influenced by 
structural location because power is generated by an individual’s dependency on another 
individual to whom they are tied. The present study adopts Weber’s (1914) definition of 
power which is the ability to control another’s resources. Power is an interesting social-
psychological concept because structural power can impact people’s behavior. A seminal 
study by Kipnis (1972) found that those with structural power are more likely to attempt 
to influence others and think less of the performance of less powerful individuals. 
Consequent studies revealed how structural power can also increase positive affect, 
increase attention to rewards, and increase automatic cognition (see Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
and Anderson 2003 for a review).  
In many instances, it may be unnecessary for a person to actually have structural 
power as their behavior will be altered similarly by merely believing themselves to have 
power (Anderson and Galinsky 2006; Chen and Lee-Chai 2001; Galiksnky et al. 2003). 
Priming provides a way to activate the psychological properties of power through a task, 
and one way it can be achieved is by asking the participant to recall a time when they 
how power over an individual.  For example, when Anderson and Galinsky (2006) had 
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participants recall a time they felt powerful, those participants were more likely to draw 
an “E” in a self-oriented position on their forehead instead of in a position oriented for 
other people to read. Chen and Lee-Chai (2001) found when participants with an 
exchange relationship orientation were power primed through semantic cues (i.e. sitting 
in a professor’s chair), they were more likely to behave in self-interested ways. Thus, 
while primes do not create power, they nevertheless induce a comparable mental state in 
the individual useful for certain applications”.1  
Experimental work has shown that priming power creates less concern for social 
consequences (Galinsky et al. 2003), resulting in less of a need to pay attention to other 
people’s perspectives (Galinsky et al 2006), including expert opinions (Tost, Gino, and 
Larrick 2012). Priming power also motivates people to focus on information that’s 
consistent with their existing knowledge (Fischer et al 2011), resist persuading messages 
(Brinol et al 2007), and rely more on mental shortcuts through automatic social cognition 
(Keltner Gruenfeld and Anderson 2003; Fiske 1993). Conversely, people who have low 
power have greater concern for social consequences, engage in more controlled analytic 
thinking, and want to consider other people’s perspectives (Galinsky et al. 2003; Fiske 
1993). The power prime developed by Galinksy and colleagues (2003) has been found to 
produce reliable and robust effects and has been used extensively in social psychology 
experiments since its inception. 
This brief review demonstrates that structural power has been empirically shown 
to influence attitudes and ultimately behavior. Broadly, individuals with power tend to be 
                                                          
1 We make the assumption that feeling powerful from a prime, and having structural power, are 
interchangeable for this study.  
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less likely to be concerned with the perspectives of others and their social consequences 
are not perceived as threatening. Because power impacts how we attend to the 
perspectives of others, it would be useful to connect this evidence with other theories that 
involve attending to other individuals. Identity theory is one such research area that 
involves attending to the perspectives of others through reflected appraisals. Thus, we 
believe it would be important to analyze how power and identity theory intersect in order 
to better understand what social factors can impact how people respond to their 
environments. 
Identity Theory 
To understand how identity theory can intersect with structural power, we will 
briefly review the relevant aspects of identity theory. Identity theorists have differentiated 
between three different types of identities: role, person, and social; the current study will 
be using the framework of the role identity. The role identity originated from the work of 
McCall and Simmons (1978, p. 65) and is defined as one’s “imaginative view of himself 
as he likes to think of himself being and acting as an occupant” of a certain role. The 
“role” in role identities derives from the “cultural expectations tied to social positions in 
the social structure that actors try to meet” (Burke and Stets 2009, p.39). These roles 
involve a cluster of values, duties, rights, and obligations associated with a particular 
identity and are enacted through our behavior (Burke and Stets 2009). Importantly, these 
role identities have idiosyncratic dimensions, as different actors holding the same identity 
may attach different meanings to their identity (McCall and Simmons 1978). For 
example, if a professor takes on the meaning of “protector of students” for their professor 
identity, then they may behave differently than a different professor that does not hold 
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this idiosyncratic dimension (Burke and Stets 2009). However, the two different 
professors may both share the role of caring about academic research. How identities help 
us navigate and behave in our environment depends on their salience and prominence.  
A prominent identity is simply one that is subjectively important to a person 
(Brenner, Serpe, and Stryker 2014; Ervin and Stryker 2001). Individuals can rank various 
identities in terms of importance in a prominence hierarchy. On the other hand, identity 
salience is defined as the “probabilities of each of the various identities within it being 
brought into play in a given situation” (Stryker and Serpe 1982, p.206), which can be 
referred to the set of all identities in a hierarchy as well.  Thus, salience is defined in 
terms of the behavioral output from the identity and prominence is defined in regards to 
cognition. Prominence can be thought of as relating to one’s “ideal self” whereas salience 
can be thought of as relating to one’s “situational self” (Burke and Stets 2009). For 
example, one can have a prominent guitarist identity that is personally meaningful, but 
their barista identity becomes salient while they are in the situation of working at a coffee 
shop. This individual will enact their barista identity while they are at work, but at home 
they may enact their guitarist identity and practice guitar. Both prominence and salience 
are influenced by how much commitment an individual has for a particular identity.  
Where an identity ranks on the salience or prominence hierarchy depends on the 
commitment an individual has to that particular identity. Commitment is defined as “the 
degree to which the person’s relationships to specified sets of others depends on his or 
her being a particular kind of person” (Stryker and Serpe 1982 p.207). Thus, commitment 
deals with how our social connections influence the devotion we have for a particular 
identity. The greater the commitment an individual has to a particular identity, the more 
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salient or prominent the identity will be (Stryker and Serpe 1982). The more salient the 
identity, the greater the likelihood it will impact our behavior. This occurs because we 
aim to behave in ways that act consistently with the roles of our identity. Thus, a barista 
in a coffee shop is very likely to act in a way consistent with their barista identity, but 
they are likely to enact their guitarist identity in a more neutral environment because it is 
more important to them. The barista’s number and strength of ties to their co-workers 
influences the level of commitment of the salient barista identity. Additionally, the 
number and strength of ties with the guitar player’s band members creates the 
commitment for the prominent guitarist identity.  
How other individuals impact the strength of commitment occurs through the 
process of reflected appraisals. Reflected appraisals are the feedback we get from 
significant others that influence our identities (Felson 1985; Mead 1934). Individuals 
prefer consistency between the meaning of their identity and input from reflected 
appraisals (Burke and Reitzes 1991). If our close associates inform us that we are 
behaving in a way inconsistent with our identity, we will attempt to reduce any mismatch 
between the two.  
Reflected appraisals have a direct connection to the power literature because both 
involve processing the perceptions of others. As noted above, greater power makes 
individuals attend less to the perspectives of others. Thus, if reflected appraisals involve 
attending to the perspectives of others to construct the meaning of our identity, then 
higher levels of power may disrupt this process. The intersection of power and reflect 
appraisals leads us to our first proposition: 
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p = actor 
P1)   The more p feels powerful, then the more p rejects reflected appraisals.  
 
Although separate concepts, identity prominence and identity salience are related. 
Research has shown that as identity prominence increases so does identity salience 
(Burke and Stets 2009). For example, a prominent guitarist identity may become more 
salient when an individual enters a stage, but will be less salient while attending a 
baseball game. The guitarist identity is still subjectively important (i.e., prominent) to 
them, often making the identity somewhat salient, but the salience can change within 
different environments. Importantly, salience and prominence can become functionally 
equivalent as individuals become aware of the salience of their identities (Stryker and 
Serpe 1994). Thus, if a participant completes a survey asking how important an identity is 
to them, the prominence of the identity can align with the salience and both prominence 
and salience can be primed.2 These identities help us navigate the social world, but 
sometimes we are exposed to information that is incongruent with the values of our 
identity, which can alter our behavior. Social scientists define these scenarios as identity 
threats.  
Identity Threats 
The Identity Control Model (Figure 1) illustrates the cybernetic process of 
identity threats, within the Identity Theory framework (Burke 1991; Stets and Burke 
2009). The model begins with the input, which consists of the information to which 
                                                          
2 While identity salience and prominence have a great deal of conceptual overlap, Brenner, Serpe, & 
Stryker (2014) found that prominence precedes salience.  
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individuals are exposed from their environment. This input is biased by our perceptions, 
which are included as the perceived self-meanings in the model. Then these perceived 
self-meanings are influenced by reflected appraisals, which can be defined as a process 
that influences how we see ourselves from the input of our associates (Felson 1985; Mead 
1934). After that, we compare the perceptual inputs to our identity standard, or the set of 
meanings associated with the roles of an identity, with the comparator. The comparator 
assesses the similarity of the meanings between the perceptual inputs and the identity 
standard one has in their memory. Error occurs from a mismatch between the perceptual 
inputs and our identity standard, creating the identity threat. Finally, our output is the 
behavior that occurs to correct any mismatch between the inputs and our identity 
standard. The less error, the less need for role performances (behavior) to be consistent 
with the identity standard. 
 
Figure 2.1 Identity Control Model Adopted From Burke (2009).  
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This cybernetic model provides us with a foundation and inspiration for our next two 
theoretical propositions: 
P2)  The more p rejects reflected appraisals that do not support the identity, then the less 
mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard.  
P3)  The less mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard, then the less 
p engages in error correcting behaviors.  
Burke and Stets (2009: p66) provide a simple example of gender identity to 
illustrate this process. Let’s say there is a man named Tom who has a salient masculine 
identity. Tom receives feedback from others (reflected appraisals) that he is acting 
feminine, which creates a mismatch between the identity standard and perceptual inputs 
(identity threat). To correct this, Tom may engage in a masculine behavior to relieve the 
mismatch. Exposure to this error between the identity standard and perceptual inputs, 
which creates an identity threat, has been studied extensively (see Branscombe, et al. 
1999 for a review). 
Identity threats are unpleasant and individuals often try to reduce the threat as 
much as they can. Sometimes this means rejecting evidence. For example, when the 
conservative identity of an individual is made salient, they are even more likely to reject 
the existence of climate change (Unsworth and Fielding 2014). Psychologists have found 
that having a participant think of positive values (i.e. thinking of how they are a good 
spouse) can make them more likely to accept identity-threatening information (Sherman 
and Cohen 2006; Sherman 2013). This suggests exogenous social variables could impact 
the Identity Control Model, but to date, such psychological mechanisms have not been 
explicitly combined with the Identity Control Model. The present research aims to 
introduce power as an exogenous variable in the Identity Control Model. We propose that 
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power influences the Identity Control Model as mentioned in the earlier propositions and 
that this ultimately impacts how a person responds to identity threatening information. 
Because power makes people less attentive to the perspectives of others, they may not 
experience mismatch between the input and identity standard. Less mismatch would 
create less need for engaging in error correcting behaviors.  If an individual is not 
engaging in as many error correcting behaviors, then they will be more likely to reject 
identity threatening information.  
P4)  The less p engages in error correcting behaviors, then the more p will reject 
identity-threatening information.  
 
Current Study 
As noted above, there is good reason to believe that the perception of power may 
influence the Identity Control Model. Figure 2 shows how power can be added into the 
Identity Control Model as an exogenous variable.  
Given that individuals who feel powerful are less concerned with the perspectives 
of others, this would make them more likely to down weight reflected appraisals. It is 
difficult to empirically differentiate between outright rejecting or down weighting 
reflected appraisals. So when this paper comments on the rejecting of reflected 
appraisals, it is understood that it may not be a complete rejection. If individuals are not 
as concerned with reflected appraisals, there would be less mismatch between their 
perceptual input and identity standard. Less mismatch between perceptual input and the 
identity standard would create less error and less error-correcting behaviors. Reduced 
error-correcting behaviors may make individuals more likely to reject new identity 
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threatening information. Therefore, power can be then studied as an exogenous variable 
in the Identity Control Model as summarized by the following propositions:  
1)   The more p feels powerful, then the more p rejects reflected appraisals.  
2)  The more p rejects reflected appraisals that do not support the identity, then the less 
mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard.  
3)  The less mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard, then the less 
p engages in error correcting behaviors.  
4)  The less p engages in error correcting behaviors, then the more p will reject 
identity-threatening information.  
 

























Participants and procedure 
The researchers recruited 217 undergraduate students (166 women) at the 
University of South Carolina to complete an experiment using Qualtrics software. Before 
beginning the experiment, the participants had to sign an informed consent form (see 
Appendix A). Participants completed the study in exchange for course credit. In this 
experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a high (n=100) or low (n=117) power 
condition.  
The current study aims to evaluate how feeling powerful and powerless impacts 
the processing of identity threatening information. The key independent variables of 
interest are feeling powerful or powerless. The dependent variable is the acceptance of 
evidence that threatens a prominent identity. The identity the current study assessed was a 
college student identity. College student identity prominence was measured through 
questions assessing the importance of the identity that were adopted from Brenner, Serpe, 
and Stryker (2014). Because the participants were made aware of their college identity by 
these survey questions, the prominence and salience are functionally equivalent (Stryker 
and Serpe 1994). Questions about the participant’s race, gender, college major, and 
confidence that one’s major typically finds good employment after college were also 
asked at the end of the study (see Appendix B).  
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The empirical indicator for high power was a priming task that made participants 
feel like they have power over others. The empirical indicator for low power was a 
priming task that made participants feel like other people have power over them (see 
Appendix C). These tasks were adopted from Galinsky and colleagues (2003) and have 
been shown to make people feel powerful or powerless by recalling a time they felt 
powerful or powerless. The participants had 10 minutes to think about the event and 
describe how they felt and had to write at least 250 characters. 
 Immediately after each subject finished writing, they were exposed to the identity 
threat. Because all the participants were University of South Carolina students, the 
researchers threatened the prominent college student identity with false information that 
suggested college is no longer relevant or valuable. Participants read a summary of some 
fake studies that argue college degrees are becoming irrelevant and people obtain a 
sufficient knowledge base from online material and open courses. The participants were 
then asked how much they accept the information on a 1-7 scale, as well as how credible 
they think the information is, if they think college increases income and job prospects, 
and is valuable (see Appendix D).3 Participants were also asked about the trustworthiness 
of the information as a check to make sure they took the evidence seriously.  
The laboratory experiment tested the following operational hypothesis:  
H1)  Priming participants to feel like they have power over others will make them less 
likely to accept identity threatening information.  
                                                          
3 Though each of the questions asked about college degrees, we thought they were still too dissimilar to 
combine them in an index for analysis.  
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In summary, participants were randomly assigned to low power or high power 
conditions that used a power prime as the empirical indicator for power. Participants 
primed with high power were predicted to ignore the reflected appraisals from the 
education scholars who argued college was no longer valuable in the summary they read. 
We argue that high power participants would be more likely to ignore the evidence that 
conflicts with their identity and then are less likely to engage in error correcting 
behaviors. When they are engaging in less error correcting behaviors, they should be 
more likely to report that they accept the evidence they just read about college compared 
to the low power condition. Answering the questions about college no longer being 
valuable represents the empirical indicator for how much the participant accepted the 
identity threatening information. Agreeing with the questions more strongly suggests they 
accepted more of the evidence. The acceptance of evidence questions will be condensed 
into a single index that is comprised of the mean of the responses. This will be done for 
the sake of parsimony and to reduce potential alpha error of running several t-tests. 
Factor analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha were used to determine which of the questions 
combine into the best index. Confirmatory t-tests were then used to compare the two 









College student identity prominence was measured via a Likert scale (7= “strongly 
agree”, 1=“strongly disagree”) capturing how important the respondent’s student identity 
was to them. Participants in both the low power and high power group had strong college 
student identity prominence (see Table 1). 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for student identity prominence and power.   
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A t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between the identity 
prominence index4 and the two power groups (t(215) = -.095, p >.05).   
Participants were asked four questions about how much they accepted the 
evidence they just read. These questions were measured via a Likert scale where 7 
represents “strongly agree” and 1 represents “strongly disagree.” Factor analysis revealed 
that two questions, “I think my college degree will increase my lifetime earnings” and “I 
think my college degree will help me get a better job” loaded strongly on the first factor 
(.70 and .72 respectively), while the other questions did not load strongly on any factor 
(see Table 2). The first factor explained 33.1% of the variance while the second factor 
only explained 6.2%. The Cronbach’s Alpha of these two questions was consistent with 
the factor analysis results as they yielded a higher alpha (α = .77) than including all four 
questions (α = .61). Thus, even though our index consists of just two questions, we feel it 
is the strongest representation of our dependent variable.  
A t-test showed that power did not have a significant main effect on the index of 
questions measuring how much the participants accepted the evidence they just read 
(t(215) = -.527, p >.05 (see Table 3)). Thus, power was not found to have any influence 
on acceptance of evidence. On the same 1-7 scale, participants were also asked how 
trustworthy the information they just read was. Overall, they thought the information was 
fairly trustworthy (M=5.41, SD=1.186). There was also no significant difference between 
belief in trustworthiness and power groups (t(215) = .436, p >.05). 
 
                                                          
4 This index was created by taking a mean of the four identity prominence questions.  
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Table 4.2 Factor analysis results on acceptance of evidence questions.  
 




However, this null effect may be explained by college major. One of the 
demographic questions asked if participants felt their major had a difficult time finding 
employment after college. Thus, we were curious if those who thought their major 
typically found good employment (n=117)5 would accept the evidence more than those 
who did not think their major typically found good employment after college (n=59). 
Those who neither agreed nor disagreed about their major finding good employment (n = 
41) were not included in this analysis. We found that the participants who were secure 
about their job prospects were more likely to accept the evidence compared to those who 
were insecure about their job prospects (t(174) = -2.51, p <.05 (see Table 4)).  
Because security in one’s major to produce job opportunities seemed to influence 
the results of the study, an ancillary analysis examined individuals who did not agree 
their major would get them a good job and power. Interestingly, power had a significant 
effect on the acceptance of evidence index (t(58) = 2.37, p <.05); however, it was in the 
opposite direction that was predicted. Participants concerned about their major’s job 





                                                          
5 Participants who somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed were combined into one “agree” group. 













Identities help us make more sense of our environments. Being exposed to 
information that conflicts with our identities (identity threats) can make us more likely to 
reject that information, even if it is supported by strong evidence. So, while identities can 
help us navigate our social worlds, they can also bias our information processing with 
more routinized responses. Self-affirmation has been found to make people more open to 
accepting identity-threatening information; however, little is known about the impact of 
power in processing of identity threats. This study assessed how power influenced the 
processing of a student identity threat. 
The present study first had college students read a power prime to make them feel 
powerful or powerless. The participants then read an identity threatening passage that 
suggested college was no longer valuable. The researchers predicted that participants in 
the high power condition would be more likely to reject the information. However, we 
did not find any significant effects for power. We can examine each proposition and 
assess what may have created our null results.  




Our first proposition first requires that the participant feels powerful, but we could 
not know if this was the case because no manipulation check was used. The task used to 
generate feelings of power has been well-studied, but it still would have been beneficial 
to include a manipulation check measuring the participant’s sense of power (Anderson, 
John, and Keltner 2012). It is possible that the prime did not work on a significant 
number of participants, which would certainly impact the results. Future researchers 
should include a manipulation check to know if their participants actually felt powerful 
during the study.  
P2)  The more p rejects reflected appraisals that do not support the identity, then the less 
mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard.  
Our second proposition requires that powerful participants would reject reflected 
appraisals, but our study might not have produced these appraisals adequately. It is 
possible that reading information about college outcomes from the work of education 
scholars is too indirectly related to how others view us to connect to reflected appraisals. 
Power may still reduce attention to reflected appraisals, but the current study may not 
have had any direct association to the individual. A future study could present identity 
threatening information from close friends or colleagues.  
P3)  The less mismatch between p’s perceptual input and identity standard, then the less 
p engages in error correcting behaviors.  
A potential problem with the third proposition could have been the diversity of 
college majors in our sample. Participants who believed their major would lead them to a 
good job were more likely to agree that college will increase their earnings, make them 
get a good job, and agree that colleges are valuable, regardless of condition. This 
suggests they were not affected by the identity threat since they already believed they 
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were in a lucrative major. Thus, while the two samples did not differ in college student 
identity prominence, the students may have had different meanings ascribed to their role 
identities producing different identity standards.  Just as men and women have different 
identity meanings for being a parent (Simon 1995), other identities can be influenced by 
other factors to create significant variation among individuals. Furthermore, the present 
study may not have tapped into college student identity at all. Research by Reitzes and 
Burke (1980) found that a significant meaning of the college student identity involves 
academic responsibility, so perhaps the value of college more generally falls too far 
outside the college student identity. A future study could try to threaten academic 
responsibility instead of the value of college as an intuition.  
P4)  The less p engages in error correcting behaviors, then the more p will reject 
identity-threatening information.  
Our last proposition may have been impacted by power influencing identity-
threatening information differently than theorized. When only looking at participants who 
felt insecure about their majors, we found that high power made them disagree that 
college will help them get a good job. This subgroup of participants also disagreed that 
college will increase lifetime earnings and agreed college was no longer valuable (though 
these findings only approached significance). Power has been found to increase self-
esteem (Fast et al 2009). Self-esteem is highly related to self-affirmation, which has been 
shown to protect individuals from identity threats (Sherman 2006). Perhaps power then 
protects people from identity threats as well because elevated self-esteem acts as a 
mediating variable. If this is true, such an effect may override any potential impact of 
power’s influence with reflected appraisals. However, the sample size of insecure college 
major participants was 29 and 30 for low and high power respectively. Thus, sample size 
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would ideally need to be larger to have statistical reliability and a stronger argument for 
determining causality. 
Not only did our study lack college major diversity, it lacked diversity in race and 
gender.  Our sample had an over-representation of female participants (76%) and white 
participants (81%), which limited any statistical analysis for looking at race or gender 
effects as well (see Tables 5 and 6). It would have been interesting to see if race or 
gender interacted with power in my study. This would have only been an exploratory 
analysis as we did not theorize if race or gender would impact the results. Future 
researchers could investigate these potential factors if they recruit a more diverse 
participant sample. 
This study added the exogenous social variable of power into the Identity Control 
Model. Even though power did not yield significant effects, interesting results emerged 
when the researchers only looked at participants who felt insecure about their college 
major, albeit in the opposite direction than predicted. Future research can build from 
these findings and perhaps use competing hypotheses with how power may increase or 
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CONSENT PAGE: College student attitudes 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by researchers in the 
Department of Sociology at the University of South Carolina. This research study is sponsored by 
the Department of Sociology at the University of South Carolina. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate understand college student attitudes. This page explains what you will be asked to do 
if you decide to participate in this study. Please read it carefully and feel free to ask any questions 
you like before you make a decision about participating.  
 
Description of Study Procedures  
During the study, you will use your computer to type out answers, read information about college, 
and respond to several survey questions. The study will last about 15 minutes.  
 
Risks of Participation  
Your name or other identifying information will not be used in any way in reports of the research 
findings. There are no known risks associated with participating in this research study except a 
slight risk of breach of confidentiality, which remains despite steps that will be taken to protect 
your privacy.  
 
Benefits of Participation  
At the end of the study, you will receive a thorough explanation of the study explaining what we 
hope to learn from your and other students’ participation. Thus, you will gain insight into the type 
of questions sociologists ask and how they go about answering them. Otherwise, taking part in 
this study is not likely to benefit you personally. However, this research will help us understand 
how people make decisions about groups and thus will benefit the field of sociology.  
 
Costs  
There are no costs to you for participation in this study.  
 
Payments  
Participation in this study will qualify you for extra credit and/or research participation credit in 
eligible courses you may be taking.  
 
Confidentiality of Records  
Participation will be confidential. A number will be assigned to each participant at the beginning 
of the project. This number will be used on project records rather than your name, and no one 
other than the researchers will be able to link your information with your name. Study 
records/data will be stored in locked filing cabinets and protected computer files at the University 
of South Carolina. The results of the study may be published or presented at professional 
meetings, but your identity will not be revealed.  
 
Contact Persons  
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For more information concerning this research, contact Matthew Facciani at, 
facciani@email.sc.edu Questions about your rights as a research subject are to be directed to, 
Lisa Marie Johnson, IRB Manager, Office of Research Compliance, University of South 
Carolina, 1600 Hampton Street, Suite 414D, Columbia, SC 29208, phone: (803) 777-7095 or 
email: LisaJ@mailbox.sc.edu. The Office of Research Compliance is an administrative office that 
supports the University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board (USC IRB). The 
Institutional Review Board consists of representatives from a variety of scientific disciplines, 
non-scientists, and community members for the primary purpose of protecting the rights and 
welfare of human subjects enrolled in research studies.  
 
Voluntary Participation  
Participation in this study is voluntary. You are free not to participate or to withdraw at any time, 
for whatever reason, without negative consequences. In the event that you do withdraw from this 
study, the information you have already provided will be kept in a confidential manner.  
Participation is not related to regular course work and participation or withdrawal will have no 
impact on grades. If you are participating with the goal of earning extra credit or research credit 
for a class, and decide you do not wish to participate (or you decide to withdraw) your professor 
will provide alternative means of you satisfying this extra credit or research participation 
requirement.  
 
Signatures /Dates  
By clicking the “Proceed” button below, you indicate that you have read the contents of this 
consent page. Note that even if you consent to participate, you may withdraw at any time without 
















Identity Prominence Questions 
Being a college student is an important part of my self-image. 
Being a college student is an important reflection of who I am. 
I have come to think of myself as a “college student.” 
I have a strong sense of belonging to the college student community. 
Demographic Questions 
What is your sex? 
(Female, Male) 
What is your race? 
(white, black, Hispanic, Asian, other) 
College Major Questions 
What is your major? 
Do you have a major in Science, Technology, Engineering, or Math (STEM)? 
People with my major have a difficult time finding a job after college (1-7 Likert scale) 
What is the highest education level of your mother and father? 





High Power prime: 
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or 
individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability of another 
person or persons to get something they wanted, or were in a position to evaluate those 
individuals. Using the space provided below, please describe this situation in which you 
had power what happened, how you felt, etc 
Low Power Prime: 
Please recall a particular incident in which someone had power over you. By power, we 
mean a situation in which they controlled your ability to get something you wanted, or 
were in a position to evaluate you. Using the space provided below, please describe this 



















College student identity threat:  
College has been a valuable experience both economically and intellectually for 
many students over the years. However, modern technology is beginning to change the 
educational climate. With so much information being available for free on the internet, 
motivated students can learn as much as they can from a college course without ever 
sitting in a classroom. There are also many free online courses that are taught by top 
professors in many fields. A recent study by Johnson and colleagues (2015) found that 
high school graduates who took a free online course in biology actually performed 
higher on a general biology test than USC students who took an intro to biology course. 
Another recent study by Cohen and colleagues (2016) found that participants performed 
better on the math section of the GRE when they took a free online math course 
compared to USC math majors. 
With college tuition prices sky-rocketing, some leading economists have predicted 
that the traditional college experience may become obsolete. Stanford economist Dr. Lee 
argues: “With the current market as it is, a college degree simply isn’t as valuable as it 
once was. If people obtain the skills they need from free online sources, they can be just 
as successful in the workforce as those with college degrees without the crippling debt.” 
Given the success of non-college degree students, the wealth of free information found 
online, and the economic climate, college degrees may soon be a thing of the past. 
 
Acceptance of Evidence Questions 
I think my college degree will increase my lifetime earnings  
I think my college degree will help me get a better job 
College degrees are no longer valuable 
The evidence I just read about college degrees is convincing  








Power – having the ability to control another’s resources  
Social position – any socially recognized category of actors (Wikitheoria, 2014) 
Role –  a cluster of values, duties, rights, and obligations associated with a particular 
identity and are enacted through our behavior (Wikitheoria, 2014) 
Role identity – view of oneself of being and acting as an occupant of a certain role 
Identity Salience – probability an identity being enacted in a given situation 
Commitment – the influence social connections have on the devotion individuals have for 
a particular identity 
Identity threat – one’s experience of being exposed to information that is incongruent 
with the values of their identity 
Input – the information to which individuals are exposed from their environment 
Perceptions - perceived self-meanings 
Reflected appraisals – process that influences how we see ourselves from the input of our 
associates 
Comparator - assesses the similarity of the meanings between the perceptual inputs and 
the identity standard one has in their memory 
Identity standard – set of meanings associated with the roles of an identity with the 
comparator 
Error – a mismatch between the perceptual inputs and our identity standard  
Output  – behavior that occurs to correct any mismatch between the inputs and our 
identity standard 
